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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-POWERS OF AGENCIES-RIGHT OF REGISTRANT TO
WITHDRAW REGISTRATION STATEMENT FILED WITH THE SECURITIES AND ExCHANGE COMMISSION-Petitioner filed a registration statement with the
Securities and Exchange Commission for an issue of corporate stock.
Shares of the same class as those being registered were widely held by
members of the public. Petitioner repeatedly amended the statement,1
so that it had not yet become effective nearly three months after the
initial filing. At this time, petitioner sought to withdraw its registration
statement. The commission denied the application for withdrawal, and
after a hearing, issued a stop order, preventing the statement from becoming effective and indicating its unreliability.2 On petition for review

117 C.F.R. §230.473 (1949; Supp. 1959).
2 48 Stat. 79 (1933), 15 U .S.C. (1958) §77h (d). Both a stop order and withdrawal
prior to the effective date prevent the registration statement from becoming effective and
make further sales and distribution activities through the instruments of interstate commerce or the mails unlawful. 48 Stat. 77 (1933), 15 U.S.C. (1958) §77e. However, there
are significant differences between the effects of a stop order and a withdrawal. See note
5 infra.
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of the order, held, affirmed. Where members of the public hold shares
of the same class of security covered by a registration statement filed
with the SEC, the commission may deny permission to withdraw the
statement before the effective date and issue a stop order prohibiting
further sales activities by use of the mails or in interstate commerce.
Columbia General Investment Corporation v. Securities and Exchange
Commission, (5th Cir. 1959) 265 F. (2d) 559.
In 1936, the United States Supreme Court, in Jones v. Securities and
Exchange Commission,3 held that a registrant had an absolute right, unfettered by administrative discretion, to retract a registration statement
prior to its effective date, at least where no securities of the class seeking
to be registered were publicly outstanding.4 This decision gave the registrant an absolute right to terminate the commission's jurisdiction to investigate in order to determine whether the registrant willfully had filed a
false or incomplete statement, making him amenable to prosecution.5
The lower federal courts early limited Jones to cases where withdrawal was
sought prior to the effective date. 6 The court in the principal case distinguished Jones on the ground that in that case shares of the same class
as those being registered were not publicly outstanding at the time the
registration statement was filed. 7 Although the Jones case may have been
properly distinguished to avoid the application of its rule, in the light of
congressional action subsequent to that decision the general soundness
of the distinction, and thus, the continued vitality of Jones, must be questioned. The Securities Act of 1933 originally prohibited the offering for
sale of securities filed for registration until the statement's effective date.8
In 1954, Congress amended the act so as to permit registrants to make
offers for sale and to solicit offers to buy9 during the period after filing
298 U.S. 1 (1936).
Prior to the Jones decision, the commission had discretion, under rule 960, now
17 C.F.R. §230.477 (1949; Supp. 1959), to refuse withdrawal of a registration statement,
either before or after its effective date, in any case where it had reason to suspect that the
filed statement included a material misstatement or omission. Under such rule there must
be a finding by the commission that the withdrawal is "consistent with the public interest
and the protection of investors."
5 See Jones v. SEC, 298 U.S. 1 at 23 (1936). Although withdrawal terminates the
commission's jurisdiction to investigate further concerning the registration statement,
issuance of a stop order would have no such effect. In addition, under rule 252 (c) of
the S.E.C.'s Regulation A, 17 C.F.R. §230.252 (c) (1949; Supp. 1959), adopted subsequent
to Jones, the issuance of a stop order bars the registrant's use of the $300,000 general
exemption from registration requirements for five years. A registrant armed with an
absolute right of withdrawal, however, obviously could avoid the impact of this rule.
6 Oklahoma-Texas Trust v. SEC, (10th Cir. 1939) 100 F. (2d) 888; Resources Corporation International v. SEC, (D.C. Cir. 1939) 103 F. (2d) 929; SEC v. Hoover, (N.D. III.
1938) 25 F. Supp. 484. See, generally, Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 202 (1951). See also
84 UNIV. PA. L. R.Ev. 1019 (1936).
7 Principal case at 562.
s 48 Stat. 77 (1933).
9 In practice, the general sales promotion, just short of actual sales, may be extensive.
See, generally, CHoKA, AN INTRODUCTION TO SECURITIES REGULATION 17 (1958).
3
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but before the registration becomes effective.to ·Thus, the 1954 amendments in conjunction with an absolute right of withdrawal would allow
a registrant a minimum of nineteen days (allowing one day for withdrawal) to capitalize upon the phantasm of legality afforded him by filing
the registration statement. Delaying amendments, by which he may postpone the statement's effective date, license additional time for exploitation.
Under these circumstances, it seems clear that, regardless of whether or
not. shares of the same class are held by members of the public at the time
of filing, the possible mischief resulting from an absolute right of withdrawal is equally violative of the purpose of the Securities Act of 1933.11
In the former case, a profiteering registrant might buy some of the outstanding shares, file a statement and distribute a fraudulently favorable
prospectus, and then sell his shares at a price reflecting investor optimism
generated by the false representations. To avoid an investigation which
might uncover his fraud, the registrant need only withdraw his statement.
Similarily, even if there were no shares outstanding, a registrant might
excite potential investor interest by a fraudulently optimistic prospectus,
then withdraw and consummate the sales without utilization of interstate
commerce or the mails, thus avoiding the reach of the federal act. Hence,
the distinction made in the principal case to avoid application of the
Jones rule, although proper for that purpose, appears to be generally
unsound. In either case, an unscrupulous registrant might file and capitalize upon a false or incomplete prospectus with apparent immunity
from prosecution, where an absolute right of withdrawal exists. In a
recent case,12 the Securities and Exchange Commission has faced the problem directly, rather than searching for questionable distinctions,18 and
found the effects of the 1954 amendments14 sufficient to prevent absolute
withdrawal on facts substantially the same as Jones. The position taken
by the commission is certainly worthy of support in the courts.

] ohn Edward Porter
10 68 Stat. 684
11 The design

(1954), 15 U.S.C. (1958) §77e(a), (c).
of the act and of the provision requiring registration is to protect
the investing public against imposition and fraud in the sale of securities by requiring the
full and fair disclosure of information concerning the character of the security before its
sale in interstate commerce or through the mails. See Creswell-Keith, ~c. v. Willingham,
(D.C. Ark. 1958) 160 F. Supp. 735; Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953); SEC v. Ralston
Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
12 In the Matter of Comico Corp., Securities Act (1933) Release No. 4050 (1959),
decided just three weeks after the principal case.
18 Although the existence of an option to purchase some of registrant's shares might
have raised the question of whether a public interest was involved, the commission
determined the issue of absolute right of withdrawal without regard to the option.
14 In regard to the 1954 amendments, the commission stated: " ..• we think the change
in the effect of the filing of a registration statement which was made by the 1954 amendment to Section 5 of the Act creates a public interest upon filing which precludes an absolute right of withdrawal. ..." See note, 45 VA. L. REV. 1061 (1959).

